The Relations Between England and the Northern Powers, 1689–1697.: Part I.—Denmark

Abstract

A notable feature of Baltic politics at the close of the seventeenth century was the rivalry of Sweden and Denmark, which had fought with each other during several centuries for supremacy, or even for existence. To the permanence and strength of this feeling, and its importance in the politics of the North, contemporary and modern authorities, the correspondence of Louis XIV and William III and their ministers, with Ranke, Bain, and the ‘Cambridge Modern History,’ equally bear witness. At this period, however, Denmark hankered after an alliance with Sweden, of course on her own terms. The explanation is that Denmark was a more purely Baltic Power than Sweden; If there had been peace in the Baltic, Denmark could have become powerful and wealthy; but her ministers, themselves wretchedly poor, were actuated by mercenary motives. Hence the dangerous policy of fleecing the merchants who passed the Oresund. Unfortunately, the refusal of Sweden to come to terms with her rival made it possible for the English and Dutch, especially the latter, to maintain a balance of power in the Baltic, and thus diminish Denmark's gains. Griffenfeld, who has been regarded as Denmark's greatest statesman, had seen how beneficial an alliance with Sweden, with the Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp (whose efforts against Danish absorption were vigorously supported by Sweden) and France, the rival of the Sea Powers, would be to Denmark, provided she, and not Sweden, manipulated the policy of the league for her own benefit.