The Relation of Form and Stuff in Husserl's Grammar of Pure Logic

Abstract

Husserl, in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, shows that formal logic is the anticipation (or empty intention) of inquiry into the relations of thought, language, and being which he calls transcendental An essential aspect of Husserl's treatment of formal logic is his endeavor to show both the necessity and the complexity of the relation of form and stuff (or content) in propositions considered at the most elemental level of pure logic. This Husserl does in Appendix I of Formal and Transcendental Logic, entitled, Forms and Syntactical Stuffs; Core-Forms and Core-Stuffs.' The importance of Husserl's inquiry in this regard lies in its radical difference from the mainstream of modern logic. For unlike logicians such as Carnap, who regard syntactical investigation as (a) purely formalistic and as (b) ranging over the whole sphere of logic in the sense that a formal metalanguage is held to exhaust the relevant logical characteristics of any object language,' Husserl's theory of syntax demands supplementation by elements. First, Husserl holds that the formal character of syntax necessarily requires a material correlate. Secondly, syntactical investigation for Husserl is not exhaustive but rather anticipatory of other aspects of logic. Husserlian syntactics