Abstract

This article contrasts two beliefs about the relation between the emotions and the intellect. Each sees emotional responses as fundamental and primary sources of thinking. Each sees a different role for the intellect following emotional responses to worldly phenomena. L. S. Vygotsky, articulating a belief common at his time, sees the intellect as a disciplining force, one that, after a pause or interlude, serves to temper emotions to produce a "catharsis" and what he calls "intelligent emotions," those subjected to rational thought and a higher plane of cognition than either emotion or intellect could produce alone. Jonathan Haidt, following Vygotsky by nearly a century, asserts that emotions control cognition, rather than as Vygotsky conceives, being subordinated by reason. Haidt, in the tradition of David Hume and with more empirical data than Vygotsky provides for his view, sees the passions ruling human thought and action. Any accompanying reason serves to rationalize gut feelings rather than to control them; reason, Haidt argues, is a "rationalist delusion" that gives emotional thinking the veneer of reason. This article outlines both positions and attempts to reach a synthesis of their views.

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