The Regulation of Drinking Water Quality: Control by Cooperation Rather Than Enforcement

Abstract

This article discusses the system of regulation of the quality of drinking water in England and Wales. It reflects upon the role of the Drinking Water Inspectorate within the regulatory regime and the frequency with which the Drinking Water Inspectorate exercises their statutory powers of prosecution against water suppliers. Although there is evidence to suggest that water suppliers are subject to increasing prosecution, it is contended that the generally low level of prosecution is typical of a regulatory regime that is dependent upon the cooperation of the regulated industry. The few cases that have been prosecuted by the Drinking Water Inspectorate are examined and it is clear that all of the prosecutions of water companies that have been successful have involved a guilty plea by the defendant. The only case in which there was a not guilty plea failed for evidential reasons. It is suggested that this supports the view that water companies tolerate a level of regulation and thereby cooperate with the regulator. It is concluded that effective control of drinking water quality is not achieved by criminal enforcement, but by less formal control mechanisms.