The Refutation of Substrata

Abstract

1) The substratum is an old and mysterious figure on the scene of philosophy. Its modern role, in particular, has proven to be even more difficult to grasp; almost every philosopher from Locke to C. B. Martin who adopted it felt obliged to make some form of an apology for its epistemic obscurity. Nevertheless, the substratum continues to have adherents as it did three centuries ago. The main reason for this attraction is that it offers seemingly obvious and plausible solutions to more than one problem concerning the ontic nature of objects. Use the substratum in fulfilling one function, and it promises to serve you in other ways as well, gratis. Moreover, when the task is to explain the concrete particularity of objects, it seems to have an irresistible appeal in compensating the often presumed universality of properties. In this paper I will argue that in spite of its apparent advantages, such a notion leads to logical absurdity. Moreover, it will emerge that to the extent it is protected from absurdity, the substratum becomes redundant. The substratum is conceived as a metaphysical entity that makes the object out of qualities. A featureless thing in itself (or a bare particular),' its two principal functions are (i) holding the qualities together so as to form a concrete object, and (ii) individuating the object which is thus constituted. The substratum is said to be an individuator (a principle of individuation) insofar as its being shared by a and b (understood as objects falling under appropriate sortals) implies that a and b are identical, and its not being shared by a and b implies that they are distinct. On the other hand, in accounting for how qualities are held together in a concrete object, the substratum is envisaged as an entity that bears them.2 Now it may be thought that the substra-