The Reform Theory of Punishment

Abstract

ACCORDING to the most familiar version tX of the utilitarian theory of punishment, the functions of the practice of punishment are deference and reform. It is usually assumed, moreover, that there is no particular need to examine the case for ascribing reform and deference functions to punishment separately, partly because deterence embraces reform. Obviously, if we change people in ways which preclude their ever being tempted to decide to commit crimes, to that extent we deter them (though deference might be thought to have narrower connotations, a point which is not particularly relevant to the moral analysis of this essay). More importantly, it is assumed that, if a person is prepared to accept the utilitarian account of punishment at all, he will quite naturally give the reform function an important moral place. Indeed, that punishment should be primarily reformative is thought to be the very essence of any approach which can lay claim to being humane, liberal, civilized. The purpose of this essay is to question the casual assumption that punishment ought to have a reform function and, in the process, raise certain issues which have been generally neglected. In order to suggest the nature of the difficulty I will state views on two seemingly different issues-views which are ordinarily regarded as liberal. Let us suppose they are views held by a composite individual whom we will call Mr. Enlightened. Mr. Enlightened is quite concerned about the state of communications and social organization in large-scale, industrialized societies. He sees the development of television, newspaper syndicates, bureaucracy, and the growth of the public relations function in all types of organization as constituting a clear and present danger to human freedom and human participation in the larger social decisions which affect individual lives. In many ways it is a unique threat. In all previous tyrannies the use of instruments of force and violence played a prominent role in the maintenance of the existing order. While this was wicked, it was at least visible. The oppressors were not easily concealed from the oppressed. But today the tyrants deliberately conceal themselves and their basic aims. This is what worries Mr. Enlightened. The oppressed cannot see their oppressors; indeed, the oppressed are in most cases not even aware that they are being victimized. Through control of the main agencies of social organization and communication the oppressors are able to make people conform to desired patterns of behavior, not by forcing them to do things which may or may not be against their will, but by making them choose to do the desired things. In a word, the new oppressors manipulate rather than coerce. Mr. Enlightened rails against this state of affairs. He argues that to treat human beings in this way is to violate their humanity, to treat them like dogs or tools rather than men. It is clear that the manipulation, and the wrong, consists not in prevailing upon individuals to choose certain courses of action but in doing so in ways which conceal the identity and the aims of those who influence-the hidden persuaders. Having dealt with this moral issue, Mr. Enlightened turns his attention to the institution of punishment. In this area his views are equally critical and clear. It is wicked to inflict suffering on individuals without attempting to eliminate the conditions which make the infliction of suffering necessary-conditions which are due to cir-