The Referendum in Venezuela: Elections versus Democracy

Abstract

The Referendum in VenezuelaElections versus Democracy Miriam Kornblith (bio) The impetus for convening the Venezuelan presidential-recall referendum (PRR) of 15 August 2004 came from the coalition opposed to the government of President Hugo Chávez. While the recall lost by 59 to 41 percent, just getting it held was a victory that cost the opposition and its supporters many months of exhausting struggle against a welter of formidable obstacles thrown in their path by the government and its representatives. Yet the final result also represented a disappointing reversal of the opposition's bright early hopes. After Chávez reached the midpoint of his term in August 2003, making a recall constitutionally permissible, various opinion polls showed 55 to 60 percent of the voters favoring his early departure, while only 35 to 40 percent said that they wanted him to stay. By the time the recall was finally held on 15 August 2004, after a year of intense controversy, the numbers had flipped and voters decided to keep the president. Why did national sentiment change so drastically in a year? Why did the opposition lose? What happened between August 2003 and August 2004 that reversed the generally unfavorable opinion of the president and his political project? Were the circumstances in which the process was convened and the referendum actually held conducive to the fair and accurate expression of the national will? The recall provision of the Venezuelan constitution is known as Article 72. It states that any elected public official will become subject to [End Page 124] a recall if, after the midpoint of that official's term, 20 percent of the voters in the relevant constituency sign a petition asking for such a vote. The official must leave office if at least 25 percent of registered voters take part in the referendum, and if at least as many votes are cast in favor of recall as were cast for him or her during the election. Vacancies that result from recall referenda are to be filled according to the provisions laid out in the constitution and relevant laws. If the president is recalled before the end of the fourth year of his term, a new election to choose his successor must take place within a month after the recall date. Should a recall vote succeed after the end of the president's fourth year in office (Venezuelan presidents serve six-year terms), then the presidentially appointed vice-president assumes the presidency. The constitution does not say whether a president whose departure is sought should step down provisionally during the lead-up to the referendum. Nor is it clear whether a freshly ousted president may compete in a new election following a successful recall. Since neither Congress nor its successor body under the 1999 constitution, the unicameral National Assembly, had ever passed legislation to govern the different kinds of referenda, the rules that governed the 2004 recall process were entirely ad hoc and arrived at by a decidedly dubious process, particularly given that the National Electoral Council (CNE) defined everything up to and including the limits of its own authority. The recall referendum also highlighted broad, longstanding deficiencies in Venezuela's institutional order related to phenomena such as the use of state resources by public officials, the methods of political and campaign financing, and the like. The 2004 experience underlines the need to develop a specific legal framework that can guard future recall processes against capricious or biased rule making or institutional weaknesses that might distort the expression of the people's will. The idea of constitutionally recalling Chávez became the opposition's main rallying point after the signing of a May 2003 agreement with government representatives in which all parties agreed to activate the referendum mechanism under existing laws and norms and with the help of observer missions from the Organization of American States (OAS), the Carter Center, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). On 20 August 2003—the day that a Supreme Court ruling had designated as the midpoint of Chávez's six-year term—opposition groups gathered under the umbrella of the Coordinadora Democrática (Democratic Coordination) gave the CNE nearly 3.2 million...