The Redemption of the Moral Mandate of the Profession of Law

Abstract

The traditional sociological model of professions identifies both a structural and a moral component. The structural component consists of the apparatus of selfgovernance, which in the case of the profession of law takes the form of law associations with delegated legislative authority over membership and disciplinary functions. Implicit in the institutional apparatus of self-governance are two claims characteristic of professions, that they embody an expertise mastered only after substantial intellectual training and practical experience, and that the profession is autonomous, both with respect to state regulation and market forces. Expertise and autonomy are functional aspects of professions as social collectivities; but, with slight modification, they become as well features of individual professionals. Thus it is that the practitioner is recognized as an expert, through training and experience, and her clients must place their trust in her since their own lack of expertise prevents them from gvv/8evaluating her services. The practitioner’s services are also autonomous in so far as they are not wholly shaped or wholly dictated by the demands of the client, the regulatory needs of the state, or the pressures of the market.