The reconstruction of Palestinian nationalism: between revolution and statehood

Palestinian national identification slowly but consistently strengthened following the 1967 War despite Israel's ongoing effort to undermine it. Not unlike Zionism, which, as some scholars claim, precipitated the appearance and development of Palestinian national identity at the turn of the twentieth century, Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip helped generate the reemergence of Palestinian nationalism. This chapter argues that many of the controlling apparatuses employed to manage the inhabitants affected the Palestinian population as a whole, thus highlighting the similarities among the residents of the two regions rather than their differences. Thus, while Israel deployed several controlling practices to repress Palestinian nationalism and to encourage other forms of identification, the contradictions and excesses of its controlling apparatuses actually reinforced the sense of a shared predicament, which strengthened national identification. In hindsight, it is not surprising that Israel failed to suppress the rise of national identity. But in order to better understand how Palestinian nationalism reemerged and how it, in turn, led Israel to emphasize sovereign power and de-emphasize disciplinary and biopower, it is useful to look back at one of the sites where the struggle over national identification manifested itself most forcefully: the municipal elections in the West Bank.

This research explores the development of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) over the last decade as a proxy organization of the Iranian regime, or as a group that finds its way between Palestinian nationalism and support for the religious Islamic revolution of Iran. Most studies of Islamic organizations in Palestine focus on Hamas, the “Big Brother” of the PIJ. Hamas, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, began violent operations in 1987 during the First Intifada partially due to its competition with the PIJ. Although the role of the PIJ in Palestinian society has grown in its influence, disappointingly there are very few research studies that analyze this organization. Moreover, most of these works focus on the period before the al-Aqṣā Intifada and especially examine suicide operations and the group’s motives. The main questions to be answered by this study are: What is the nature of the PIJ? Is it a religious movement with religious aims or Palestinian national one? This article analyzes these questions through an examination of the PIJ’s activity vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran. This study’s central argument is that the PIJ is a Palestinian religious national organization that sees Iran as a partner.

This chapter examines religious claims and aspects within Palestinian nationalism from the time of the British Mandate to the present. Since such endeavor necessitates an engagement with Zionism, the chapter starts by refuting a common misperception that seeks to equate Palestinian nationalism with Zionism in the latter’s use of religion to attain its political ends. The distinctions between the two regarding their “use” of religion can be conceptualized on the basis of two guiding notions: functionality and centrality of religion and/or religious claims in either respective projects. Each uses religion differently in terms of the purpose (function), and the assigned place (centrality) within the subsequent discourse and practice. The conceptualization of these two notions is offered in this chapter as a framework for analysis in discussing the specific case of Palestinian nationalism. In undertaking the analysis of the Palestinian national movement over more than a century, the chapter is divided into three parts: the decades of the British Mandate; the decades that followed the creation of Israel up through the late 1980s; and finally the decades where Palestinian Islamism has become an integral part of the Palestinian national project – from the emergence of Hamas in December 1987 to the present.

This chapter explores the impact of Palestinians on the 1967 War and vice versa, with a focus on the Palestinian national movement. Its main argument is that the descent into war was propelled not only by the conflict between Israel and Arab states but also by a multifaceted struggle among Palestinians and Arabs for control over mobilization for the Palestinian cause. This struggle was defined by three overlapping realms of contestation: that among Arab states, between Palestinians and Arab states, and among Palestinians. During the years leading up to the war, Palestinian groups, principally Ahmed Shuqairi's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Fatah movement, advanced competing claims to be the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and their aspirations. Yet their competition was also testimony to the ambiguous boundaries between the Palestinian national struggle and the larger Arab world. In developing their own conceptions of Palestinian nationalism, they were forced to address its relationship to the call for Arab unity. In vying for resources and power, they could not depend on Arab governments. These governments, themselves competing for stature and security in regional politics, in turn invoked the Palestinian cause as justification for attempts to dictate, restrict, or interfere in Palestinian mobilization. Aspirant Palestinian leaders thus positioned themselves in a matrix of opportunities and constraints constructed by rival Arab state interests. This positioning influenced the strategies that both Palestinian and Arab leaders pursued in the conflict with Israel. It was, therefore, a crucial piece of the story of the third Arab-Israeli war.

Since the turn of the twentieth century, Palestinian nationalism has succeeded in nourishing and preserving a common identity across a dispossessed and dispersed population, fought for and won international recognition, built an array of institutions to advance national goals, and defied numerous adversaries that would have preferred to see no Palestinian movement with a will of its own. This chapter examines the historical development of Palestinians’ movement for national self-determination from the late Ottoman Empire through the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Attending to the movement’s strategies, goals, and organizational forms, the chapter examines the three major uprisings that began in 1936, 1987, and 2000; the rise of fedayeen groups and the consolidation of the Palestine Liberation Organization; and the transformation of the Palestinian struggle since the start of the Oslo peace process. Along the way the chapter argues that Palestinian nationalism as an identity, ideology, and popular commitment has been stronger than the political institutions that aspire to speak in the name of that nationalism. The engine of the Palestinian national movement remains, as it has been, the Palestinian people’s demand to live with freedom and dignity.

‘Who would dare to make it into an abstraction’: Mourid Barghouti's I Saw Ramallah

This article follows the representation of Palestinian nationalism as a history of terrorism. This representation was produced in the Israeli media and academia, and broadcast by the state's political elite in international arenas. In the West, this image was accepted in many circles and affected the chances of the Palestinians having a fair hearing in the peace negotiations which began after the 1967 war. The article follows the construction of the equation of Palestinian nationalism with terrorism, assesses its impact on the peace process, and suggests the deconstruction of this narrative as the best way forward in future negotiations.

Every nationalist seeks to provide what any nation is in need of: a suitable and dignified past. No aspirant ethnic group can be without its particular myth of descent if it is to secure recognition.1 Anthony Smith’s insights are particularly apposite to the Palestinians, who are still engaged in a struggle for the realization of their national aspirations against a rival national movement, Zionism, and against the State of Israel. Palestinian nationalism serves as a valuable case study of how, in order to forge a “nation” in the present, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components of the past; failure to do so is likely to constitute a serious impediment to nation building.2 The present study therefore explores the evolution and changes in the myths of common ancestry in Palestinian nationalism. More specifically, the conception or reconstruction of a national history among Palestinians and the changes this process underwent over three distinct periods of time will be examined: from the 1920s to 1967, which favored a pan-Arab narrative; from 1967 to 1994, which marked the revival and crystallization of a distinct Palestinian identity within a broader context of Arab nationalism, that is, up to the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA); and from 1994 onward, under PNA auspices.

Learning the Narrative of the Other

This paper aims at studying the effects of the Oslo Accords on Palestinian identities of those residing in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with emphasis on comparing between refugees and non refugees living in these areas. Based on data gathered through a census conducted on Birzeit University students in 1994, and other data gathered from three census conducted on similar samples of adults from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1997, 2001, 2006. This paper will especially endeavor to answer the following questions: Did the Oslo Accords have an effect on Palestinians’ identity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip? If so, is there a difference in identity amidst the residence of these areas and between refugees and non refugees?Available data indicated that during the Oslo era Palestinian identity remained, and after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the strongest identity amongst the residence of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nonetheless, this identity lost a part of its power due to the implementation of traditional identities, particularly religious identity. The failure of the peace process with Israel and the deteriorating economical situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially after Al-Aqsa Intifada, contributed in promoting Islamic Movements, in particular Hamas, thus promoting the religious identity. Whereas, the promotion of traditional identities - especially tribal, local or regional - was a direct result of the receding role of political parties particularly leftist parties. During this phase and with the support of the Palestinian Authority of these identities, in addition to the deterioration economical situation and the separation of Gaza Strip from the West Bank though imposing hundreds of military borders into closed areas (or cantons) during Al-Aqsa Intifada, tribal and local identities were reinforced. The data also indicates that there isn’t an immense, or clear, difference between the identity of refugees and non refugees based on the various census conducted. During the Oslo era the religious, tribal, local and Arab identities have advanced amongst refugees and non refugees, and these identities have assembled in its prominence to the Palestinian identity. The similarity between the identity of refugees living inside or outside a refugee camp and between non refugees, and the impact of the Oslo Accords on this identity, can be interpreted in terms of the influence of social and political factors to which refugees and non refugees are subordinated to (such as the establishment of a Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the oppressive practices of the occupation, the failure of the peace process and the deteriorating economical status).Despite the similarities between the identity of refugees and non refugees, refugees are distinguished from non refugees based on their asylum identity (they feel that they are refugees). From the various samples, more than 83% of refugees said that they enormously feel that they’re refugees. In general this identity is a bit more reinforced amongst refugees living in camps in comparison to refugees living outside of camps. Also the majority of refugees living outside of camps (75% or more from various samples) indicated that they too feel that they are refugees.

This article examines the involvement of political parties in education, focusing on these parties’ youth movements. Specifically, the article examines the youth movement of The Young Communist League of Israel (Banki) and analyzes its educational goals and strategies in the context of the Arab Palestinian minority in Israel. In doing so, the article reveals some of the tensions and challenges inherited in Banki’s educational work as it attempts to integrate Arab youth into Israeli society, on the one hand, while strengthening their Palestinian identity, on the other. The overall picture that emerged from the data reflected strong counter-hegemonic political stances and actions via-a-vis the excluding ethnonationalism of the Israeli political regime and, to a lesser ex-tent, the leadership of Maki. Additionally, the article argues that Banki’s work could be considered counter-hegemonic because it challenges the separation between Palestini-an nationalism and Israeli citizenship by educating for an integrative Palestinian-Israeli identity.

Review

As noted in the Introduction, scholars almost universally agree that there were no traces of Palestinian identity before it was invented by the British in 1918. Rashid Khalidi and Yehoshua Porath are alone in claiming that such an identity existed a little earlier, although for Porath it was no more than a reaction to Zionism. Rashid Khalidi is the only scholar who identifies a positive Palestinian identity not connected to Zionism. In this chapter I try to delve into this issue more deeply by using new kinds of sources and relying on new kinds of theories. My general conclusion is that something was present, substantially more than formerly thought. I also claim that this “something” was crucially important for the development of Palestinian nationalism in the twentieth century. This is not a perennialist but an ethnosymbolist claim, and an explanation is called for. I do not argue that a Palestinian nation existed before 1920. I do not even argue the existence of a full-fledged, self-conscious ethnic community. What existed was a community of some meaning, difficult to categorize exactly, but highly relevant to the way Palestinian nationalism was created, which is why the topic is extremely important as a subject of study. Furthermore, I am not claiming here that the transformation from pre-modern Palestinian identity to modern nationalism was inevitable.

This article examines how the rural folkdance dabkeh has, in the last century, been appropriated and reinvented as a tradition in order to construct the imagined communities of Zionism, pan-Arabism, and Palestinian Nationalism within Palestine/Israel. This appropriation has led to extensive debates and suppositions on the source, meanings, and cultural ownership of dabkeh. The following historical narratives, emerging from interviews with dance practitioners and dance advocates in the West Bank, Israel, and Lebanon, and from literature in libraries and archives in the West Bank, Israel, and Great Britain, draw attention to the salient links between dance and politics and the multiple ways in which collective identities can be constructed and deconstructed. These histories further raise questions about how local cultural autonomy and sustainability within the Occupied Palestinian Territories have been affected by the process of political appropriation. Dabkeh,1 a circling folkdance made up of intricate steps and stomps, has helped construct three very different political communities and cultural identities during the 20th century. Zionism, pan-Arabism, and Palestinian Nationalism have all gained political credibility through the public performance of a dance2 that, in the previous century, had no associations with any of these ideals. The three histories of dabkeh present a post-nationalist critique of dance in Palestine/Israel.3 Revealing how dance can be used to define (and re-define) a collective identity, these narratives highlight the artistic legacies of Zionism, pan-Arabism, and Palestinian Nationalism. More importantly perhaps, they provide a historical baseline from which new, innovative choreographic histories might be identified and celebrated. Imagining , inventing, and salvaging cult ural identity thro ugh danc e Across the world, the social dances and movement rituals of particular groups of people have been appropriated and given a second existence4 as physical spectacles. These spectacles display a homogenized cultural identity and help validate new national, ethnic, or religious boundaries around people and place. In the public imagining of such a community,5 the invention of shared traditions6 through national folkdance troupes and festivals can make politicized aesthetics, ethics, gender roles, and social hierarchies appear inherent to a community.7 This re-invention of dances is thus highly selective and can be seen as influenced by the ideological agendas of political elites guiding the appropriation.8 As the following histories of dabkeh illustrate, shifts in these political environments and agendas can allow the boundaries of a community to continue to be guided by historical precedent while remaining in flux. Within Israel and Palestine, the search for historical precedents as a basis for contemporary cultural actions can have a particular urgency amongst population groups that have experienced collective traumas. War, exile, colonization, or other political and natural disasters can dislocate people from their cultural pasts, threatening a population's existing bonds and networks.9 Reviving elements of the distant cultural past and reconstructing them as a shared traditions can demonstrate that the past is not lost, but rather continues on into the future.10 When the traumatic events themselves are also projected across generations through cultural lamentations (in folksongs, dances, oral histories, and other arts and rituals), the disrupted social bonds of a traumatized community can appear resilient to the traumatic events.11 Folk dances can therefore be perceived as carrying both an ancient cultural past and a reminder of the threats to a traumatized community. The revival of dance heritage can, however, be highly and purposefully selective. In Palestine, this selection has further been influenced by the ways in which local cultural history was documented in the early 20th century. …

The article analyses a modern education in Palestine under the continuous Israeli occupation. After signing agreements with Israel on the formation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as an interim transitional body, the Ministry of Education and Science created a training program based on the American and Jordanian models. The educational atmosphere is strongly affected by Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, the problem of access to education remains, due to the economic problems, limited number of schools and security threats against children and adolescents. In addition, the unresolved issue of the creation of independent Palestinian state is reflected in textbooks, imbued not only with Palestinian nationalism, but also with hatred of the «occupiers». This raises the issue of the lack of idea about the peaceful coexistence of Israelis and Palestinians in the minds of young people. The existing training creates partisans, able to wait a long time for an opportunity to form an independent state on the territory of the PNA and Israel.