The Reciprocal Algorithms of Behavior and the Norm of Reciprocity

Abstract

The norm of reciprocity has been a major theme in anthropology and sociology for the better part of a century. This universally observed norm has been accounted for, or shown to be possible, in evolutionary theory by such concepts as kin selection, inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964), reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971, 1981; Alexander 1987), and game theory (Maynard Smith 1982, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Bendor and Swistak 1997). These efforts draw upon gene-centered perspectives, which see such reciprocity as basically selfish. More recently extensive reciprocity seen as based not upon selfishness, but empathy has been reportedly observed in the behavior of rhesus monkeys (de Waal 1996). F. de Waal’s approach is a welcome departure that tries to escape the selfishness of gene-centered approaches and looks to the implied motivational mechanisms. All these approaches, however, to include that of de Waal’s, have been based on the external observation of behavior. They have not attempted to identify or even speculate upon the neural mechanisms within the organism that must necessarily have been selected for by the evolutionary process to accomplish the functions of motivating, maintaining, and rewarding such observed reciprocal behavior.