The Reawakening of the Compensation Clause in the Twenty-first Century

Abstract

As part of the separation of powers in the federal government, Article , ? I of the United States Constitution guarantees federal judges "Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in office." The purpose of this clause, often referred to as the Compensation Clause, is to minimize the risk that Congress may directly or indirectly attack or threaten the judiciary by reducing salaries paid to Article judges. The clause is seemingly clear in its language and intent. In fact, a relatively small number of actions have required an appellate court to interpret its meaning. During the past several years, however, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have published opinions in two cases pertaining to the Compensation Clause. While the opinions in United States v. Hatten 532 U.S. 571 (2001), and Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019 (C.A.Fed.2001), cert, denied, 122 S.Ct. 1221 (2002) (Breyer, joined by Scalia and Kennedy dissenting from denial of cert.) did not announce new doctrine, they did clarify two important Compensation Clause-related issues: the constitutionality of indirect reductions in judicial compensation, and Congress's ability to rescind previously legislated increases in judicial salaries. Hatter provides a strong statement in defense of a rational interpretation of the pur pose and original intent behind the Compensation Clause. While protected from clear dis crimination from Congress, judges are not completely insulated from bearing the costs of citizenship as other federal employees. Williams v. United States, on the other hand, involved congressional action that was equally detrimental to federal judges, con gresspersons, and a number of high-ranking members of the executive branch. Looked at together, they provide a glimpse into the future of Compensation Clause jurisprudence.