Abstract
Explanationist accounts of rational legal proof view trials as a competition between explanations. Such accounts are often criticized for being underdeveloped. One question in need of further attention is when guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) in criminal trials. This article defends an inference to the best explanation (IBE)-based approach on which guilt is only established BARD if (1) the best guilt explanation in a case is substantially more plausible than any innocence explanation, and (2) there is no good reason to presume that we have overlooked evidence or alternative explanations that could realistically have exonerated the defendant. This is a comparative account, which I argue is better suited for arriving at accurate verdicts than the non-comparative ‘no plausible alternative’ account that many explanationists tacitly assume. Furthermore, this account is not susceptible to the most important arguments against IBE in criminal trials or to arguments against other, non-explanationist interpretations of the BARD standard. I use a case study to illustrate how this account provides meaningful guidance for decision makers in criminal trials.
Highlights
In criminal trials, fact finders often face a choice between competing scenarios
My interpretation is an expanded version of Thagard’s (2003, 2008) proposal that we could interpret the beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) standard as a form of inference to the best explanation (IBE). This is a comparative account of the BARD standard: we determine whether guilt is proven by looking at how well our guilt explanation performs compared to competing innocence explanations
When is an explanation that implies the defendant’s guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt? In this article I proposed an inference to the best explanation (IBE)-based approach on which guilt is only established BARD if (1) the best guilt explanation in a case is substantially more plausible than any innocence explanation, and (2) there is no good reason to presume that we have overlooked evidence or alternative explanations that could realistically have exonerated the defendant
Summary
Fact finders (judges or juries) often face a choice between competing scenarios. My interpretation is an expanded version of Thagard’s (2003, 2008) proposal that we could interpret the BARD standard as a form of inference to the best explanation (IBE) This is a comparative account of the BARD standard: we determine whether guilt is proven by looking at how well our guilt explanation performs compared to competing innocence explanations. In contrast with the competing probabilistic framework of rational criminal proof, explanationists argue that fact finders often cannot meaningfully attach probabilities to particular scenarios. What they can reason meaningfully about, is whether an explanation is plausible.
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