Abstract
AbstractThe term ‘miracle’ generally refers to events that are not explicable by natural causes alone. Kant’s notion of miracles is usually understood along these lines. However, Kant’s occupation with miracles should be understood in a practical context. Belief in miracles plays a constitutive role in Kant’s philosophy of religion concerning the need to strengthen the will both before and after departing from original evil. I demonstrate how my argument sheds new light on Kant’s claim that theoretical reason precludes the possibility of material miracles.
Highlights
Background considerationsBefore delving into details, let me present three relevant background considerations: (i) Kant’s claim concerning the alleged dispensability of belief in miracles from a purely practical perspective; (ii) Kant’s definition of miracles and the distinction between theistic and demonic miracles; (iii) the need for a moral revolution as described by Kant in the first piece10 of RGV.As for (i) the alleged dispensability of miracles: Kant argues that in a pure moral religion belief in miracles is ‘dispensable’; only when one wants to ‘introduce’ pure moral reason in positive11 religion, might one ‘embellish’ it with stories which include miracles, for without this embellishment, pure moral religion would allegedly not gain any ‘authority’ (RGV, 6: 84)
My aim in this paper is to introduce a comprehensive practical rather than theoretical reading of Kant’s treatment of miracles, and to show how the practical perspective might refine our understanding of the theoretical possibility of miracles according to Kant
In RGV Kant’s whole discussion of miracles is subordinated ab ovo to this practical line of reasoning;7 in Kant’s words, ‘we want to know what miracles are for us, i.e. what they are with regard to our practical use of reason’ (RGV, 6: 86)
Summary
Let me present three relevant background considerations: (i) Kant’s claim concerning the alleged dispensability of belief in miracles from a purely practical perspective; (ii) Kant’s definition of miracles and the distinction between theistic and demonic miracles; (iii) the need for a moral revolution as described by Kant in the first piece of RGV. In Kant’s philosophy of religion the belief in supernatural (divine) interference plays an indispensable role with regard to two important contexts It serves as an indispensable moment of strengthening of the will before the primordial decision for moral revolution takes place (in relation to the need to launch the struggle against evil). It serves as an inescapable moment of strengthening of the will after the primordial decision for moral revolution has taken place (in relation to the need to fully triumph over evil) In both cases belief in miracles is not necessary on the pure formal level; it is inescapable given the real (not the ideal) background in which the finite agent acts. Regardless of this specific challenge, Kant’s rich discussion on miracles reveals that Kant did not just look for a solution to a classic question in the philosophy of religion, but rather presented an encompassing philosophical theology, in which belief in miracles plays an ‘inescapable’ role.
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