The Realm of Possibility

Abstract

Abstract In Chapter I, I tried to loosen the grip that a certain paradigm has on the thinking of many philosophers. I mean, of course, the actualist paradigm according to which all the materials needed for our metaphysical and logical theorizing are to be found in the actual world and its constituents.1 It is exemplified in Russell’s Theory of Descriptions whose intent is to paraphrase away any apparent references to nonac tual objects.It exerts its influence in the tendency of many philosophers these days to dismiss the “Meinongian excess”, as Russell would put it, of any theory that countenances reference to merely possible worlds or merely possible objects. It manifests itself in the currently orthodox interpretation of the logical symbolism, the existential quantifier “(3x)” in particular, that Russell bequeathed us; an inter pretation that treats all statements about what exists as statements about what exists actually. And, more relevantly (for our present concerns), it shows up in the standard interpretations of the early Wittgenstein’s version of logical atomism, interpre tations that tend to take it for granted that Wittgenstein’s atomism, like Russell’s, was committed to actualism.