The Reagan Administration, the Soviet Union and Nuclear Arms: Hopes and Fears

Abstract

The Reagan Administration has met with widely differing hopes and fears with regard to its nuclear policy. Many people in the Western world, especially in the United States, have hoped for a radical shift in what has been perceived as unilateral American restraint in the 70's. Others have feared that the Adminstration's hawkish rhetoric has foreshadowed a dangerous escalating arms race between the superpowers. The Adminstration's nuclear weapons policy is considered in terms of its 'essentialist' view of the Soviet Union as an adversary, and the substance of this view is elaborated. Its consequences are assessed and the probabilistic character of any assessment is stressed. Possible consequences are evaluated by focusing on the tenability of an American 'Grand Strategy', the 'convergence' between American and Soviet nuclear doctrines; the restraints on such a policy resulting from domestic American politics and the long-term consequences for the Atlantic Alliance are suggested. The close relationship between domestic American politics and American nuclear policy is stressed. It is emphasized that any deterministic assertions as to an automatic action-reaction phenomenon between the doctrines of the superpowers has to be considered with scepticism.