Abstract

Complex and overlapping regulations governing the conduct of audits in the banking industry are dominated by the internal controls and audit committee requirements of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). Empirical tests using confidential supervisory data show that banks subject to these requirements under FDICIA are capable of conferring benefits that are useful to regulators in monitoring their financial condition. These benefits, however, are not evident uniformly across time nor across banks that vary by inherent accounting risk.

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