The re-election of corrupt mayors: context, relational leadership and level of corruption

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study examines why citizens re-elect corrupt mayors, adopting a conceptual framework that considers two mitigating factors in punishing corrupt leaders: first, a strong relationship between the mayor and the citizens; second, a low level of corruption that may be considered negligible by the citizens. Both factors are contingent on local contexts. Thus, the study investigates in clustered local contexts, the impact of variables related to the mayor-citizen (taking account of the duration of the political career, party membership and trasformismo/party-switching) and the level of corruption on mayoral re-election. The results shows that the relationship between the mayor and the citizens is a mitigating factor that works homogeneously across contexts, albeit based on different factors. With regard to low levels of corruption as a mitigating factor, evidence of this is found only in medium and highly developed communities. The theoretical and policy implications are examined.