The rationalization of meaning and understanding: Davidson and Habermas

Abstract

To the doctrinal schisms that always divided philosophers, the twen tieth century added a cultural rift that bifurcated the philosophical world into mutually indifferent factions. Alongside the differences in interests and tradition which still separate Anglo-American from Continental philosophy, however, there are many areas of in vestigation which they share. Prominent among these is the analysis of meaning and understanding, which has been among the central, if not the central, concern in both traditions this century. It is this area of philosophy, accordingly, that contains especially promising possibili ties for the rapprochement that is already underway. This is evidenced by the recent convergence in the doctrines of two philosophers, each a prominent member of one of the two traditions. Donald Davidson's theory of meaning forms one of the major paradigms in analytic philosophy of language. Its two most salient features are, first, construing meaning as given by truth conditions, and, second, treating understanding as an undertaking that necessarily finds its object to be rational. J?rgen Habermas has recently produced a theory of meaning and understanding that has two highly similar features and that draws out the consequences attending the second.1 For him, meaning is constituted by satisfaction or validity conditions, and understanding is essentially a critical undertaking. Despite their differences, these two philosophers form a united front extending across the Anglo-Continental divide, a front which can be labeled "the rationalization of meaning and understanding". Davidson and Habermas not only share a theory of meaning and understanding, but they do so within the framework of highly similar projects. For Davidson, one cannot understand another person's actions unless one can interpret his or her speech. Understanding language, in other words, is part of the wider project of understanding miman beings. So Davidson advances the idea that a theory of interpretation, together with a theory of decision, form a comprehen sive theory for interpreting human action in general.2 Habermas, too, aims at a comprehensive theory of action, in particular social action.