The Rational Soul in Iamblichus' Philosophy

Abstract

JJ?. Finamore: The Rational Soul in Iamblichus' Philosophy 163 The Rational Soul in Iamblichus' Philosophy John F. Finamore It is well known that Iamblichus insisted on a special position for the human soul. It is separate from Intellect and the other higher souls, and holds an intermediate position between them and nature below.1 But if the human soul is entirely separate from Intellect, how does the soul unite with it? If it does so through an intellectual component of its own, how is this psychic ???? different from the higher ???? and how does this conception of ???? differ from that of Plotinus? Iamblichus lays out his theory in the De Anima and, to some degree, in the De Mysteriis and in the fragments of his Platonic commentaries. In this paper, I wish to examine this theory of the soul and see how Iamblichus' solution is consistent. Iamblichus thought that Plotinus and other Platonists did not adequately differentiate the Intellect from the human soul.2 In In Timaeum, frg. 87, we are told that Iamblichus argued against Plotinus' opinion that there is "in us something impassible (?tta??? t?) that always thinks (?e? ?????)" (lines 8-9). Iamblichus argues that if there were this highest part of our soul, we would be perfectly happy at every moment. Rather, Iamblichus concludes, the whole human soul descends from the higher levels into this lowest realm of nature. "For if the ???? is this [highest part], it does not concern the soul. But if it is part of the soul, the rest [of us] is also happy" (lines 20-21). Further, Iamblichus says, we learn from the Phaedrus that the highest part of the soul descends as well.3 Thus, Iamblichus concludes that the 1 I have discussed this issue in the first chapter of J.F. Finamore, Iamblichus and the Theory ofthe Vehicle ofthe Soul (Chico 1985) 1 1-32. 2 See the works cited in Finamore (above, note 1) 92-94. See also CG. Steel, The Changing Self: A Study on the Soul in Later Platonism (Brussels 1978) 34-38, and RAl. Berchman, "Rationality and Ritual in Plotinus and Porphyry," Incognita 2 (1991) 189-200. 3 On this fragment, see lamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Diálogos Commentariorum Fragmenta, JAl. Dillon, ed. and trans. (Leiden 1973) 382-3, and Steel (above, note 2) 40-45. 164Syllecta Classica 8 (1997) whole human soul sinks to the level of nature, that none of it remains above, and that ???? is separate from the human soul.4 What then is this highest part of the human SOUl if it is not ????? Iamblichus is interested in this same problem in his De Anima. In De Anima 318.12-15, Iamblichus discusses the intellect:5 Many of the Platonists themselves introduce the intellect into the soul at the same time as the first entry of soul into body, and they do not differentiate at all between the soul and its intellect. In De Anima 365.5-366.1 1 , Iamblichus states who these Platonists are and compares his own beliefs to theirs.6 These Platonists say that all souls are made from one 4 Van den Berg in his paper in this collection (pages 149-162) has questioned whether we can use this fragment from Proclus' Timaeus commentary as evidence for Iamblichus' own views. Van den Berg sets out an intriguing argument that (1) whereas this fragment states that the highest part of the soul is the charioteer (???????), Iamblichus believed that the highest part was the helmsman (??ße???t??), which was for him the soul's One (In Phaedrus, frg. 6) and (2) whereas here the soul is affected by the descent, Iamblichus held that some souls were unaffected. I will return to the second point later. As to the first, there are three possible ways to accept the fragment as evidence for Iamblichus' beliefs. First, when Iamblichus discusses matters that are beyond human ken (the One, the gods, intellect), his vocabulary is flexible and suited to the argument at hand. Thus, in De Mysteriis 1.15, Iamblichus calls this highest element t? ?e??? èv ?µ?? ?a? ??e??? ?a? Iv, ? e? ???t?? a?t? ?a???? ??????? ("the divine, intellectual, and one in us—or if...