The rational design of regional regimes: contrasting Amazonian, Central African and Pan-European Forest Governance

Abstract

Forests have been an important issue in world politics at least since the UNCED conference in Rio in 1992. Since then the focus of academic attention has been on global forest governance by an international forest regime complex consisting of several forest-related regimes. This strong focus leaves a research gap regarding regional regimes addressing forests as an issue area, which recently greatly gained in empirical and academic relevance. It is particularly important to understand the institutional structures on the one hand, and the policies developed within such regimes on the other. In order to obtain a better understanding of this in the forest case, the aim of this article is to analyse the institutional design of three regional forest regimes and to develop fields and hypotheses for future research. We built upon the rational design of international institutions framework developed by Koremenos et al. (Int Organ 55(4):761–799, 2001), and based our findings on content analysis of key documents as well as participant observations and expert interviews in selected occasions. The regional regimes chosen for this study were Amazonian, the Central African and pan-European forest cooperation. The results indicate that the designs of the three regimes greatly differ regarding membership, scope, control, centralisation, and flexibility. This seems to be mainly due to differing degrees of formality of the regimes (from treaty to non-treaty to hybrid regimes) as well as different power structures amongst members and regional hegemons involved. Based on our findings, future research fields for the study of regional forest-related environmental, trade, commodity, and management regime structures as well as regime policies are identified. Such insights advance our understanding of international forest governance not only by global, but by regional forest regimes as well. This is particularly true for our understanding that similar issue-specific problems, such as sustainable forest management, in terms of regime structures and regime policies may be addressed quite differently, largely depending on the preferences of regional powers and hegemons and other potential region-specific factors. We conclude by questioning a hypothesised diffusion of international institutions and propose the more precise concept of institutional osmosis instead.