The ranking assumption

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to raise some general objections to the whole concept of making decisions on teleological principles. Its scope is finally the whole concept of how we rationally decide, on a teleological basis, to do any act at all. However the arguments developed here arise from the recent discussions about one particular species of teleological decision-making - utilitarianism. Therefore, while I hope that the paper has consequences that are important far beyond this one ethical theory, my objections are phrased in terms of direct arguments about utilitarianism. The recent lively debates on this topic make it easy to ask some interesting questions about this sort of goal-oriented theory. However, if my objections are correct, the scope of these questions is much wider than any one utilitarian theory (or cluster of theories) because my objections are about an assumption that is common to all teleological theories and not just to classical utilitarianism.