The question of social conformity in Wiredu’s consensual democracy

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article is a continuation of a debate about social conformity in practicing consensus. The debate arose from my response to Kwasi Wiredu’s proposal for consensual democracy, which he proposed as an alternative to the majoritarian democracy many African countries inherited from their colonial masters. In the course of his proposal, Wiredu had presented the activity of deliberation as a purely rational affair. I had, in a 2014 article, disproved this with evidence, and also outlined three social conformities (also with evidence) that could undermine the epistemic value of a consensus decision. Bernard Matolino has, in a 2016 article, interpreted me as writing that consensus will lead to inferior decisions. He has also argued that my outline of the social conformities is already accommodated in Wiredu’s proposal, and argued that my proposal of a devil’s advocate is needless. In this article, I demonstrate that Matolino’s interpretations and arguments are groundless.