Abstract
Abstract The aim of this paper is to vindicate the Cartesian quest for certainty by arguing that to aim at certainty is a constitutive feature of cognition. My argument hinges on three observations concerning the nature of doubt and judgment: first, it is always possible to have a doubt as to whether p in so far as one takes the truth of p to be uncertain; second, in so far as one takes the truth of p to be certain, one is no longer able to genuinely wonder whether p is true; third, to ask the question whether p is to desire to receive a true answer. On this ground I clarify in what sense certainty is the aim of cognition. I then argue that in judging that p we commit ourselves to p’s being certain and that certainty is the constitutive norm of judgment. The paper as a whole provides a picture of the interplay between doubt and judgment that aims at vindicating the traditional insight that our ability to doubt testifies our aspiration to know with absolute certainty.
Highlights
The notion of absolute certainty has been almost completely removed from the agenda of contemporary epistemologists
I reply by considering several ways in which our doubts might be irrational and by arguing that these cases are compatible with the claim that certainty plays a threefold constitutive normative role for cognition: certainty is the aim of questioning, it is the commitment of judgement, and it is the norm of judgment
The claims defended so far are grounded on phenomenological considerations: we observe the dynamics of conscious cognition by being conscious cognizers and we observe that (i) we can doubt whether p is true if we take the truth of p to be uncertain; (ii) we can’t seriously doubt whether p is true if we take the truth of p to be certain; (iii) in asking whether p is true we want to know whether p is true; (iv) we can’t seriously doubt whether p is true if we are judging that p
Summary
The notion of absolute certainty has been almost completely removed from the agenda of contemporary epistemologists. I wish to counter this tendency by arguing that the desire to possess certain knowledge is a constitutive feature of our inquiring mind. It is not some sort of psychological or philosophical compulsion that can be extirpated through proper philosophical analysis. I reply by considering several ways in which our doubts might be irrational and by arguing that these cases are compatible with the claim that certainty plays a threefold constitutive normative role for cognition: certainty is the aim of questioning, it is the commitment of judgement, and it is the norm of judgment. The paper as a whole provides a picture of the interplay between doubt and judgment that aims at vindicating the traditional insight that our ability to doubt testifies our aspiration to know with absolute certainty
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