Abstract
The UK Supreme Court judgment in R v Gul presented a unique opportunity for a judicial appraisal of the definition of terrorism contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. While the applicant was ultimately unsuccessful in his challenge, the Supreme Court's rejection of the state's argument that reliance on prosecutorial discretion could mitigate certain absurd applications of the section 1 definition of terrorism, eg the labelling of acts of UK or other military forces as terrorist, has potentially wide-raging implications for the UK's counter-terrorism measures. In addition, the powerful obiter dictum arguing in favour of a reform of this definition and a ‘root-and-branch’ review of counter-terrorism legislation is a strong rebuke of recent high profile misapplications of such powers.
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