Abstract
In 1993, both houses of Congress passed and President Clinton signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Just four years later, fast-track legislation stalled short of a vote in the House of Representatives, despite the endorsement of the president and majority-party leaders. Using interest group head counts in lieu of roll-call data, I test the theory that fast track was a referendum on the district-level economic impact of NAFTA. The findings show that economic and political aftershocks from NAFTA, including trade-related job losses in many members' districts, helped to undermine House support for fast track in 1997.
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