The Puzzle of Moral Memory

Robert Cowan

doi:10.1163/17455243-20192914

Abstract

A largely overlooked and puzzling feature of morality is Moral Memory: apparent cases of directly memorising, remembering, and forgetting first-order moral propositions seem odd. To illustrate: consider someone apparently memorising that capital punishment is wrong, or acting as if they are remembering that euthanasia is permissible, or reporting that they have forgotten that torture is wrong. I here clarify Moral Memory and identify desiderata of good explanations. I then proceed to amend the only extant account, Bugeja’s (2016) Non-Cognitivist explanation, but show that it isn’t superior to a similar Cognitivist-friendly view, and that both explanations face a counterexample. Following this, I consider and reject a series of alternative Cognitivist-friendly explanations, suggesting that a Practicality-Character explanation that appeals to the connection between the practicality of moral attitude and character is superior. However, I conclude that support for this explanation should remain conditional and tentative.

Highlights

Background KnowledgeI note two pieces of background knowledge directly relevant to MM
Drawing upon resources from the moral deference literature, I consider and reject a series of alternative Cognitivist-friendly explanations of MM (§3–6), suggesting that a Practicality-Character explanation that appeals to the connection between the practicality of moral attitude and character is superior (§7)
MM applies to a plethora of hypothetical cases, real-life examples of phenomenological and behavioral symptoms distinctive of memory, or the use of memory language, in moral contexts are unusual.,19,20 Second, something similar to MM can be found in normative domains like aesthetics and prudence, e.g

Summary

Moral Memory

I here provide initial clarification of MM. I first delineate the kinds of memory and moral proposition within MM’s scope. I wrote a paper about it in graduate school but I really can’t remember what my view was.” In such cases, it’s plausible that we interpret subjects as having forgotten a non-moral aspect of an argument they once held. Even if successful – and the fact that cases of moral information seem okay is a problem – the resulting explanation wouldn’t be Non-Cognitivist, since it merely appeals to intuitions about desires and not their nature. In addition to cases suggesting that desires may sometimes be extroversive memory states, there are more troubling examples indicating that Desire/Emotion explanations may be inadequate This is because they appear falsified by a certain kind of third-person case of moral forgetting wherein the subject does not seem aware that they have forgotten. I turn to assess a series of Cognitivistfriendly explanations

Perspectival Explanation

Disjunctive Explanation

Moral Wherewithal Explanation

Virtue Explanation

Concluding Remarks

Biographical Note