The Putin Predicament: Problems of Legitimacy and Succession in Russia by Bo Petersson (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Putin Predicament: Problems of Legitimacy and Succession in Russia by Bo Petersson Darrell Slider Petersson, Bo. The Putin Predicament: Problems of Legitimacy and Succession in Russia. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, 237 ibidem, Stuttgart, 2021. 219 pp. Notes. References. €34.90 (paperback); €22.99 (e-book). The 'predicament' in this informative study by Bo Petersson is that Putin's regime is based primarily on personal charisma. Charismatic legitimacy can disappear quickly and is difficult to transfer to a successor. The author argues that this makes the regime vulnerable and portends future instability. In part, the system is vulnerable by design: institutions that could provide for succession have been systematically dismantled or undermined. For example, there is no genuine ruling party that could put forward a successor; the nominal ruling party, United Russia, is a creature of Putin's Presidential Administration. After an overview of scholarship on leadership, charisma and succession, Petersson proceeds to analyse how major issues that have confronted the [End Page 191] Kremlin in recent years have impacted political stability and Putin's legitimacy. The author restricts his analysis largely to Putin's numerous speeches, interviews and press conferences; he also focuses primarily on the period from 2011 to 2021, arguing that the political system changed dramatically with Putin's return for his third and fourth terms. Protests against Putin and election fraud in late 2011–12 and the rise of a rival, Alexei Navalny, created a new set of potential threats to the regime that underscored the political dilemma. Though the book was completed a year before Putin's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the framework presented here supports the argument that fears of declining legitimacy may have been a key motive. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russia's fostering of separatism in Ukraine's eastern provinces provided a major legitimacy boost at a critical time of declining trust in the president. It also provided a useful target for media attacks, post-Maidan Ukraine, along with the United States in the role of 'puppet master.' In one chapter, Petersson demonstrates how 'othering' has produced a changing cast of enemies who both threaten Russia's existence and promote values (in short, 'Gayropa') that repel most of its citizens. Constitutional changes pushed through in 2020 figure prominently in the book, and Putin used the plebiscite to postpone the problem of term limits for himself that otherwise could have caused problems in 2024 when his second term (and fourth overall) came to an end. The new provisions allow Putin to continue to serve, if reelected, until 2036; thus, '[t]he answer to who was to succeed Putin was — Putin' (p. 181). Petersson contends that by early 2021, though, the 'Crimean consensus' had weakened, and the Kremlin was on the defensive. Fears of a resurgent opposition were heightened by the exposure of the FSB plot to kill Navalny, his widely seen documentary on the gaudy palace under construction on the Black Sea coast, and large protests following Navalny's imprisonment on returning to Russia. One problem that is not addressed sufficiently in this study is how the Russian public would recognize Putin's missteps and policy failures as they happen. Petersson argues that a key component of Putin's charisma derives from his reputation as a leader 'who can and will deliver the goods' (p. 62). Yet that perception can easily be the result of manipulation. Policy outcomes that outsiders objectively understood as failures, including several discussed in this study, were not perceived as such by Putin's core supporters. Russia's response to the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, was an abject failure; excess deaths in Russia as a percentage of the population were higher than for any other major country. Russians, though, were repeatedly told by Putin and his media that he handled the crisis more effectively than other world leaders. More recently, the 2022 attack on Ukraine failed to provide an anticipated quick victory and led to a level of wartime casualties not seen since World War Two. State media [End Page 192] covered up these failings, and the Russian public rallied around a wartime leader seeking to preserve the homeland against...