The Pursuit of Happiness

Abstract

The relation between Sartre’s own treatment of ethics and Kant’s, or perhaps a Kantian, ethics is discussed in literature,1 and the goal of this chapter is not to present an argument for any specific position with respect to whether Sartre’s ethics are, or are not, Kantian. Nor is there a suggestion that Kantian and Sartrean ethics can be compressed into a single ethics. Rather, this chapter begins with recognition of the clear tension that exists between these two approaches to ethics, and instead of trying to resolve that tension, encourages an exploration of this tension from a new perspective. Specifically, the tension between Kantian and Sartrean ethics is developed to include direct consideration of the pursuit of happiness, which in turn is used to suggest a more complete understanding of what it means to live a ‘good’ life. The chapter begins with a review of major criticisms that Sartre raises against Kantian ethics, and then offers a response to these criticisms through the consideration of the role of happiness in ethics for Kant. As a result of these responses, a new charge, that Sartre does not embrace the meaningfulness of a positive account of happiness, might be raised. It is argued that Sartre’s account of authenticity, and the accompanying joy that is experienced in authenticity, might be developed by more directly including happiness as a creative act that recovers the fullness or ‘totality’ of our being. Ultimately, it is suggested that, even for Sartre, perhaps what we might ‘hope now’ is happiness.