The Public Law Litigation Model and "Memphis v. Stotts"

Abstract

On June 12, 1984, Supreme Court held in Memphis v. Stotts [104 S.Ct. 2576, 52 LW 4767 (1984)] that Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not give federal trial courts authority to modify consent decrees requiring employers to institute class-wide, race-conscious hiring and promotion programs to block layoff of minority employees hired as result of such settlements of employment discrimination suits. The high court found that Section 703(h) of Title VII prohibited tampering in this manner with operation of a bona fide seniority system. The decision is of interest to public administrators for three reasons. First, decision greatly limits power of federal trial judges to prevent layoff of minority employees in order to maintain representation of minorities within an organization. Second, decision shows a conscious, but shortsighted effort by a number of Supreme Court justices to curb equity powers of federal judges to fashion raceconscious relief for class-wide victims of employment discrimination. It shows growing support on high court to put further limitations on public law litigation model as applied to employment discrimination remedies. Third, decision fuels debate over whether Title VII permits any type of class-wide race-conscious relief designed to remedy the present class-wide effects of past discrimination or to prevent similar discrimination in future. ' Title VII, decision implies, provides for remedial relief only for individual victims of employment discrimination. Under this interpretation of Title VII, Justice Department has begun an aggressive campaign to get cities, counties and states to seek modification of consent agreements and judicial orders requiring class-wide hiring or promotion of minorities. The Justice Department argues that these actions are necessary in light of Memphis v. Stotts decision. 2 Regardless of public perception that federal trial judges have imposed preferential hiring programs on countless public jurisdictions, many more employers have voluntarily made an effort to increase representation of minorities in their organizations or have entered into EEO binding consent decrees in order to end costly litigation.3 In fact, a large percentage of Title VII pattern or practice employment discrimination suits are settled prior to a final determination of guilt or innocence. It is principal thesis of this article that Mem* The Supreme Court's decision in Memphis v. Stotts prohibits a federal court from enjoining operation of a bonafide seniority system that results in layoff of minority fire fighters. The employees had been hired pursuant to a consent decree requiring Memphis Fire Department to increase significantly its hiring and promotion of minorities. Besides limiting equity powers of a court to modify a consent decree to stop minority layoffs threatening to set back an affirmative action program, decision indicates that Title VII may prohibit relief to actual victims of employment discrimination. This decision threatens to undermine strong public policy favoring settlement of employment discrimination complaints under Title VII.