The Public Company Whistleblowing Environment: Perceptions of a Wrongful Act and Monetary Attitude

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and Dodd-Frank Acts created a unique environment for whistleblowing at public companies. SOX requires public companies to establish anonymous reporting channels, and Dodd-Frank outlines substantial monetary incentives for reporting securities law violations directly to the SEC. In response to these provisions, this study examines whether the type of securities law violation (fraudulent financial reporting versus insider trading), individuals' psychological assessments of the wrongdoing, and individuals' monetary attitude influence intentions to report to an internal hotline and to the SEC. We find internal reporting is driven by increased perceptions of responsibility to report a wrongful act, whereas external reporting to the SEC is driven by increased perceptions of seriousness regarding the wrongful act. Finally, we find that individuals' attitude toward money explains reporting intentions; however, we do not find any evidence that monetary attitude leads to increased reporting to the SEC.Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.