The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea

Abstract

This article contributes to the growing scholarly literature endeavouring to explain Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. While much of the debate relies on the grand theories of International Relations such as realism, liberalism or constructivism, this article approaches the puzzle from a psychological point of view and discusses several middle-range theories within this genre. These theories are examined sympathetically but critically, spelling out the added value they might have in elucidating Russian foreign policy, while also considering the methodological limitations in producing plausible explanations. Moreover, the article strives to overcome the traditional juxtaposition between the idea of rationality as a standard account of agency, and various psychological interpretations. Obvious methodological problems notwithstanding, the article concludes that cognitive and psychological features—such as the possibility of groupthink, assessment of prospects, operational codes and belief systems, personality characteristics and emotions—can be applied to the Russian case and they can all explain Russia’s higher willingness to take risks in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. In that way, they can provide us with partial explanations, and indeed are important elements of our understanding of Russian foreign policy in general and the Crimean case in particular.