The psychic life of freedom: Social pathology and its symptoms

Abstract

This paper discusses the relationship between Axel Honneth?s intersubjective theory of recognition and his political theory of democratic ethical life by addressing the potentials and difficulties attached to the notion of social pathology. Taking into account the diverse uses of this concept throughout Honneth?s oeuvre, it focuses initially on two of its formulations: first, the more recent discussions presented in ?The Diseases of Society?, some of which can be read in continuity with arguments presented in Freedom?s Right; second, an implicit conception of social pathology that can be found in Struggle for Recognition. These formulations involve contrastingly different premises with regard to phenomenological, methodological, social-ontological and etiological matters. I argue that such differences can be better grasped if one bears in mind two distinctive ways of understanding the fundamental intuition at the basis of the notion of social pathology: either as an analogy or as a homology. By disclosing the actual or potential discrepancies between both conceptions, the aim is to outline the grounds on which they could be brought together within the framework of a comprehensive concept. With this purpose, I then critically examine a third conception of social pathology which was first presented in Suffering from Indeterminacy and later developed, with some restrictions, in Freedom?s Right. Finally, a definition of social pathology is suggested which can bring together the different contributions of each conception while avoiding their pitfalls.