The Proposals for Presidential Government in Israel: A Case Study in the Possibility of Institutional Transference

Abstract

The politicians who call for the adoption of a presidential system in Israel assume that it will bring about the establishment of a stable and effective government capable of dealing successfully with the major problems facing Israel.' Moreover, the personality of the president would, they claim, become a symbol of national unity helping to reduce the major cleavages dividing Israeli society, namely those between the religious and secular sectors, Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews, Jews and Arabs, rich and poor, and doves and hawks. The necessity of establishing a coalition government is singled out as the major deficiency of the present parliamentary system. The proposals to change the present parliamentary system would put an end to the almost extortionist character of the demands made by the minor coalition parties on the government. These pressures, according to the proponents of the reform, have been the main factors in undermining the stability of the government and its ability to govern and create major anomalies in the allocation of scarce national resources. The presidential system, essentially one like the Fifth French Republic, is singled out as particularly relevant for removing the shortcomings of the Israeli political system.