The proper scope of the principle of procreative beneficence revisited.

Abstract

The principle of procreative beneficence (PB), first suggested by Julian Savulescu, argues that: If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, then they have a significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life is expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go best or at least not worse than any.of the others. (Savulescu and Kahane 2009, p. 274). While the validity of this moral principle has been widely contested, in this paper we move away from these issues and grant, for the sake of argument, that PB is a valid moral principle, and that the justification for PBprovided by Savulescu and co-authors is sound. We do this in order to explore the implications and consequences of accepting PB and show that even if we put aside questions about the validity and theoretical foundations of this principle, PB has many interesting, astonishing and highly problematic implications that have not been made explicit in the writing of Savulescu and others who support the notion of an obligation to bring to birth the best child possible (Glover, in: Justice between age groops and generations, 1992; Harris, J Med Ethics 28(3):204, 2002). We suggest that these implications should be taken into account when considering both the soundness and strength of PB.