The Proper and Orthodox Way of War: Henry Stimson, the War Department, and the Politics of U.S. Military Policy During World War II

Abstract

Traditional accounts of the Allied grand strategic debates during World War II stress the divergence between the American and British approaches to waging war against the Axis. In these interpretations, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and their military chiefs were the primary shapers of grand strategy and policy. However, these studies have focused too much on certain figures and have relatively marginalized others who played crucial roles in shaping these debates. One of those comparatively overlooked figures was U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who was a vital player on the American side in influencing the politics of U.S. strategy and pushing it toward launching a second front in Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were often internally divided over how to win the war and struggled to influence policy accordingly. The lack of focused political coordination between the War Department and the JCS made it difficult to convince Roosevelt to adopt a cross-Channel attack, which opened the door to following the British Mediterranean strategy for defeating Germany, starting with the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa.