The promises and pitfalls of the ECB’s ‘legitimacy-as-accountability’ towards the European parliament post-crisis

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article argues that the European Central Bank’s legitimacy mainly rests upon ‘throughput legitimacy’ in practice and, in particular, upon perceptions of accountability among the ECB’s main political audiences, including the members of the European Parliament. This thin and contingent ‘legitimacy-as-accountability’ gives rise to a tension post-crisis: on the one hand, the ECB’s enlarged monetary policy role requires ever-wider scrutiny and parliamentary debate; on the other hand, the quality of accountability hinges on the specialisation of those involved. To address the paradoxical challenge of both wider and more in-depth oversight, the article discusses a number of recent policy proposals. Empirically, it draws on survey and interview data covering the decade 2009–2019, i.e. the ‘crisis parliament’ of 2009–2014 and the ‘post-crisis parliament’ of 2014-2019. It concludes with a reflection on the promises and pitfalls of the ECB’s legitimacy-as-accountability towards the European Parliament(s) during the COVID-19 crisis.