The Proliferation of Peace Operations and U.S. Army Tactical Proficiency: Will the Army Remain a Combat Ready Force?

Abstract

Abstract : In the post Cold War era, the United States Army has undertaken an ever increasing number of operations that are classified under the general heading of peace operations. In order to address the difference military operations, the Army modified its keystone doctrine for war FM 100-5 and published FM 100-23 Peace Operations. The emergence of a peace operations doctrine implies a fundamental difference in training, organization, and execution between peace operations and traditional warfighting operations. Although both FM 100-5 and FM 100-23 address war and peace operations they do not address how participation affects tactical units. Traditionally, the U.S. Army has focused it's training on traditional combat operations. However, events of the post Cold War era indicate that tactical units must have the flexibility to do both warfighting and peace operations. This monograph examines the scope and complexity of peace operations and the effects that these operations have on Army tactical units. It also analyzes the degree to which tactical unit core competencies are reinforced or degraded by preparation for and execution of peace operations. The monograph defines tactical unit core competencies and examines peace operations conducted by the United Kingdom Canada and the United States. The conclusions reached in this study suggest that participation in peace operations can adversely affect the warfighting skills of tactical units. Evidence suggests units trained and organized for combat operations can maintain core competencies in warfighting skills while participating in peace operations if provided adequate resources for training perishable collective warfighting skills.