The Problem with Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism

Abstract

Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of Assertion, Knowledge and Context2 establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for I know that P vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI),3 and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the varying standards that comprise a truth-condition of I know that P are sensitive to factors that attach to the speaker as the putative subject of knowledge, rather than as the speaker of the knowledge attribution. That is, according to SSI, these factors of the subject's context determine a single set of standards that govern when the subject himself, or any other speaker, including those not engaged in conversation with the subject, can truthfully say that the subject knows. Thus, we do not get the result that contextualists insist on: that one speaker