Abstract
In this article, the problem of transworld identity – that is the question, if and how it is possible to ground the intuition that the same individual exists in more than one possible world – is solved by arguing that individuals have essences. First of all, it is claimed that the concept of transworld identity is desirable since it betters both global pan-essentialism and counterpart theory. Then, necessary terminology for successful understanding of the transworld identity problem is introduced. Afterwards, it is contended that the well-known Chisholm’s paradox for transworld identity can be resolved by appealing to individual essences. It is argued that if extreme haecceitism is true, then essences of individuals are non-qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are ontologically grounded. On the other hand, if reductionism is true, then essences of individuals are qualitative and hence haecceitist switches are impossible. Finally, it is shown that by referring to individual essences across possible worlds it is possible to solve the problem of cross-world identification.
Highlights
Two problems of transworld identity are addressed. (i) The metaphysical problem of transworld identity, due to Chisholm (1967), is a question – if there are haecceitist switches, what grounds them? typically, one can straightforwardly accept non-qualitative individual essences to solve it, a novel rectification of Chisholm’s paradox, one that is not partisan with respect as to whether individual essences are qualitative or not, will be offered. Since it is metaphysically contentious whether individual essences are qualitative or not, one should take it as a virtue that one can find non-binding grounds to solve this paradox. (ii) An epistemic/ semantic problem of transworld identity, due to Kaplan (1967/1979), is a question of identification of individuals across possible worlds – how can one determine that an individual in one possible world is one and the same as the individual in another possible world? It will be shown how the standard solution to this problem, viz. acknowledging the fact that one can stipulate that one is considering a possible world where such and such individual exists (Kripke 1980: 42-53), is compatible with the proposed solution to Chisholm’s paradox
Minimal3 transworld identity can be defined as: MINIMAL TRANSWORLD IDENTITYdef = there are individuals I1 and I2 such that, I1 exists in a possible world w1, I2 exists in a possible world w2 (w1≠w2), and I1 is identical to I2.4
If reductionism is true, individuals have qualitative essences and it is impossible for two distinct individuals to have the same essential qualitative properties, and there are no haecceitist switches
Summary
Existing in the actual world, this dog exists according to another possible world, i.e. it is a transworld individual. One can straightforwardly accept non-qualitative individual essences to solve it, a novel rectification of Chisholm’s paradox, one that is not partisan with respect as to whether individual essences are qualitative or not, will be offered. Since it is metaphysically contentious whether individual essences are qualitative or not, one should take it as a virtue that one can find non-binding grounds to solve this paradox.
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