Abstract
This chapter discusses Spinoza’s views on the numerical difference between finite minds. It shows, first, that this problem only arises because Spinoza addresses the issue of the reality of the mental independently of the issue of the ascription of mental content to particular subjects. Consequently, it is only after 2p7 that he develops the notion of individual minds; yet he does so before addressing the issue of physical individuation. This distinction between themes in Spinoza is reminiscent of the strategy of those contemporary approaches that assume compatibility between the notion of first-person authority and semantic externalism. But why is it important for Spinoza to be able to account for the numerical difference between subjects? Were it not possible to draw distinctions between finite minds, one of the most crucial tenets of Spinoza’s political philosophy—the view that one’s judgment cannot be delegated to the state—would be undermined.
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