The problem of the knowledge of esse in Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

The article analyzes the problem of the knowledge of being (esse) in Thomas Aquinas, in the context of his distinction between two intellectual operations, and the metaphysical real composition between essence and being. The main thesis of the article is that the distinction between the first and the second intellectual operation, i.e. between simple apprehension and judgment, follows the distinction between being and essence in created things. On the basis of Owens?s distinction between propositional and existential judgment the synthetic character of judgment is shown as an expression of the synthetic character of the being itself. The conclusion is that the being which is known by the judgment is actus essendi and not being of the truth of the proposition. At the end it is shown that the knowledge of the being as a metaphysical principle and as a facticity of thing is the expression of the twofold character of very being, essential and existential.