THE PROBLEM OF THE (IR)RATIONAL AGENT: THE QUESTION OF THE DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN ETHICAL REFLECTION AND ACTION IN KIERKEGAARD’S PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

In this paper, I will examine the problem of the (ir)rational agent, and discuss the issue of discontinuity between ethical reflection and action in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. The quality of infinity of ethical reflection generates the problem of justification of its interruption: since the reflection cannot stop itself, the question arises as to how it is possible to “deduce” action from it. This means that an individual can either be a highly rational non-agent (if he indulges in reflection) or an irrational agent (if he interrupts reflection to instigate action). I will pose the problem in an epistemological way, and thus try to answer the question of the formation of existential beliefs, that is, beliefs with ethical-religious content. I will try to prove that, although the process of formation of existential beliefs requires a sudden interruption of ethical reflection, this does not mean that the transition from reflection to action is unjustified, and ethical-religious beliefs unfounded. Furthermore, I will try to show that the moment of choice, which is an essential element of the formation of existential beliefs, does not render the process irrational. Namely, I will show that the choice, which is carried out in the process of adopting existential beliefs, does not refer to their content, but to their actualization in the domain of practice. The subjective thinker does not choose low-probability beliefs that are not supported by evidence, but decides to prove existential beliefs existentially — by living by them.