The Problem of Passive Constitution

Abstract

In speaking of the concept of passive constitution and passive synthesis, we raise the central problem in the interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. It is with the introduction of this concept that transcendental phenomenology distinguishes itself from traditional transcendental philosophies which, since Kant, have considered all syntheses as the “spontaneity of an act of understanding.” Yet it is not only the relationship of phenomenology to this tradition but also its own character as a theory of transcendental constitution which is still controversial. Twenty years ago Eugene Fink already pointed out that Husserl’s use of the term “constitution” fluctuates “between sense-formation and creation.”1 Instead of “sense-formation” one can also use the term “apperception” which means the apprehending and determining of something as something. Husserl’s most important and basic operative concepts lack precision, particularly in the case of his concept of “transcendental life.” And yet it is only after we have made these basic concepts precise that we can answer the question: who or what really is the “transcendental subjectivity”? In response to this question we do not have, as is well known, a general consensus.