The problem of other minds

Abstract

That there are sensations of pain, that pain occurs, that people have pains is a matter of fact. We know that we ourselves have pains and we know that others have pains. No speculation about the nature of sensations can be convincing, in the last analysis, if it is incompatible with this fact. This is not to say, of course, that it may not be interesting to restrict ourselves to possible internal inconsistencies or other similar weaknesses of such a view. Also, pains are felt and exist only in being felt; this is not a fact but a piece of grammar. Still, pains are felt, that is, people have pains; and this is a fact, the very same fact with which we began. These are simple, but important, matters. I wish to consider them more closely, with a view to canvassing the most prominent philosophical alternatives regarding our knowledge of other minds. For one thing, the items mentioned rule out solipsism; not because solipsism is a false or untenable belief but because it would disallow all possible beliefs we may hold regarding the sensations felt by others which are otherwise eligible within the game of facts sanctioned by our grammar. If solipsism were regarded as a belief, in the same sense in which I may believe you are in pain now, it would be upset by the fact of your pain. This would be too easy a victory; also, it would commit the solipsist to holding that it is not meaningless to speak of another's pain. If, on the other hand, solipsism is a philosophical thesis of another sort any other sort but a belief about the facts it would be irrelevant to insist that, as a matter of fact, people do have pains ; still, it would be crushing to insist that, as a matter of grammar, people may have pains and, in fact, do. What is baffling about solipsism is what it may be sup posed to have established. Having discarded a portion of our grammar and, therefore, all hope of investigating an entire sector of otherwise eligible factual questions, the solipsist disingenuously asks us to show him where he is mistaken. If he allowed the investigation, his beliefs would soon be shown to be mistaken ; but by a grammatical innovation alone, he disqualifies certain possible factual beliefs that we know perfectly well