The Problem of Other Minds; Some Preliminaries

Abstract

Abstract This chapter aims to develop some thoughts about the nature of the problem of other minds, rather than offer a solution. In section 1, the character of the problem of other minds is contrasted with the character of the problem of self-knowledge. Both concern knowledge of psychological states, but the major difference is that worries about scepticism have dominated consideration of other minds, though have been ignored when considering self-knowledge. In section 2, three candidate ways to formulate the problem are articulated and compared. It is argued that we should not be asking whether we know about other minds, nor asking the completely general question how is it possible to know, but rather be asking how we know about other minds. In section 3, P. F. Strawson’s famous conception of the problem is expounded and criticized as resting on dubious assumptions about meaning. In section 4, it is argued that psychological states involve something being a certain way in the interior of subjects, but paradoxically inspecting the interior of subjects does not, arguably, reveal the presence of the psychological state. It is suggested that knowledge of the presence of these interior features is generated by perception of the subjects from outside when they are viewed as organisms in an environment. Finally, in section 6, an as yet unsolved component in the problem is claimed to be that we lack any understanding of how to generate knowledge as to whether artificial objects, such as robots, can possess psychological states or not.