THE PROBLEM OF MODEL ADEQUACY IN THE APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Abstract

The article considers the use of game theory in international relations and the risks associated with it. An analysis is made of the possibility of reflecting the same real situations using different game models with different connotations. The concept of the adequacy of the model in relation to the situation is considered, as well as the necessary logical stage of proving this adequacy and the risk of manipulative influence in the absence of such proof. Attention is paid to the phenomenon of the model itself and its relation to the real object of modeling.The opinion is argued about the need to prove the similarity before using the analogy as an argument for attempts to persuade on the basis of this similarity. The mechanism of manipulation is considered in which, by skipping the discussion of the adequacy of the model, it is automatically considered adequate, so the author of the model can impose his own forecasts on the consumer of information regarding the development of events, as well as his own subjective vision of the positivity of the results.As an example, two well-known problems in game theory are considered, actively used for modeling international relations: the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Chicken game. An example of modeling the same hypothetical situation using both games and differences in subjective perception of the same results, which are manifested in the choice of which of these games to use, is given. The opinion is given that although both games can be very useful in the field of international relations, when consuming information which incorporates these and other games, it is necessary to carefully check not only the author's forecasts regarding the development of events, but also the assessment of the positivity of the results in the model.