The Problem of Legitimacy for Illegitimate and Semi-Legitimate Regimes

Abstract

It is well-known that the former Soviet-type regimes in Europe and Eurasia suffered a deficit of legitimate authority. Whenever crises erupted, there was a simple explanation: These regimes were unpopular. They lacked legitimacy. Nevertheless, the overall track record of these regimes shows that instability and breakdown of authority were the exception rather than the rule. On balance, they were quite stable and their authority was broadly accepted. Such stability and popular acceptance appears to require explanation in light of the undeniable lack of legitimacy of these regimes. To be sure, Communist ideology purported to legitimize the Party's monopoly of power. But this ideology was manifestly unconvincing, both as ethical argument as to why people should, accept Party's leading role, and as explanation of why they did in fact, accept it. For many observers, it was totalitarianism that filled the explanatory gap. According to such an account, while only a small part of the population accepted the official ideology by their own choice, the regime's authority was bolstered through inculcation of the ideology by indoctrination, propaganda, and agitation. To complete the picture, the totalitarian vision saw resistance as being neutralized by various means of political and social control. Totalitarian regimes were viewed as combining fanaticism, and idealism with the desire of many to escape the burden of freedom and responsibility. Such factors, combined with force, terror, and monopoly of information, created a coherent vision into which Communist ideology fitted nicely. All this was thought to explain the relative stability of Soviet-type regimes. It also explained their occasional crises as resulting from as-yet-incomplete totalitarianism. Over time, the inadequacy of such accounts became increasingly apparent. The more became known about these regimes, the clearer it became that the totalitarian model was false and seriously misleading, not only as an account of softening post-Stalinist regimes, but of Stalin's regime too. This paper will inquire into neglected sources of legitimate authority that fill the explanatory gap between the official theory of legitimacy and the significant level of legitimate authority which Soviet-type regimes actually enjoyed. It first examines several extra-legitimate sources of authority beside fear and coercion, such as habit, self-interest, and existential pressures of the system. It then shows why such sources of authority were insufficient, and why Soviet-type regimes, like all regimes, needed to build reservoirs of positive legitimate authority. It then explores the role of sources of legitimate authority that are often overlooked, such as awe and respect for the might of the state, its ability to satisfy needs, and fusion of regime with the state, its history, traditions, symbols, and cultural and athletic achievements.