Abstract
The discourse regarding intentionality and interpretation in analytic philosophy of art, although ample and lively, has concerned itself almost exclusively with the literary medium. Starting from a paper published by Hans Maes, I discuss the complications that may arise in straightforwardly applying current intentionalist strategies to the realm of the contemporary visual arts. I first present a detailed account of the difference between hypothetical intentionalism and moderate actual intentionalism which will help to better understand the nature of Maes’s arguments in his paper. I then argue that the characteristics which shape the approach of moderate actual intentionalism cannot be accommodated by certain contemporary visual artworks. I will demonstrate how in certain contemporary artworks, should a viewer be interested in accepting actual intentions within her interpretation, she will have to do so with an extreme intentionalist posture rather than a moderate actual one.
Highlights
The relationship between artistic intentions and the role they play in interpretation is one that has been dealt with extensively in analytic philosophy
I argue that the characteristics which shape the approach of moderate actual intentionalism cannot be accommodated by certain contemporary visual artworks
I conclude by claiming (i) that Maes is advocating in favour of an interpretative strategy known as extreme intentionalism, rather than moderate actual intentionalism; (ii) that this misstep on Maes’s part strays from the peculiar, and unique, way that certain contemporary visual artworks have of engendering their meaning
Summary
The relationship between artistic intentions and the role they play in interpretation is one that has been dealt with extensively in analytic philosophy. The collection of essays edited by Gary Iseminger is arguably the most exhaustive anthology on intentionality and interpretation and all the essays comprising it deal almost exclusively with the literary medium. This attitude can be witnessed in Robert Stecker, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: An Introduction (Lanham, ML: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), in the chapter ‘Interpretation and the Problem of the Relevant Intention’. Maes’s claims are a promising start to explore the relationship between current intentionalist theories and their possible integration with the contemporary art world His conclusions underestimate the complexity of the issue they address and require further development. I conclude by claiming (i) that Maes is advocating in favour of an interpretative strategy known as extreme intentionalism, rather than moderate actual intentionalism; (ii) that this misstep on Maes’s part strays from the peculiar, and unique, way that certain contemporary visual artworks have of engendering their meaning
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