The Problem of Enhanced Control

Abstract

dAccording to the problem of enhanced control, while indeterminism may not diminish control, it does not enhance control, and thus indeterminism is superfluous to freedom and responsibility. It is often thought that the problem of enhanced control is a problem only, or at least especially, for event-causal libertarians. The idea is that whereas agent-causal libertarianism differs from compatibilism in requiring that free agents possess the agent-causal power, the only essential difference between event-causal libertarianism and compatibilism is that the former requires the presence of indeterminism. It is first argued that the problem of enhanced control, if a problem for event-causal libertarians, is just as much a problem for agent-causal libertarians. It is then argued that minimal event-causal libertarianism secures enhanced control vis-à-vis compatibilism because it accords agents the opportunity to exercise their abilities of reflective self-control in more than one way.