Abstract
The right against self-incrimination plays an essential role in the construction of an accusatorial criminal procedure system that legitimizes the jus puniendi. With the rise of models of criminal liability for legal entities in various jurisdictions, could this right be conferred upon them? What would be its scope in this perspective? This article, through bibliographic review and deductive theoretical method, first examines the extension of fundamental rights to legal entities. Subsequently, the focus turns specifically to the right against self-incrimination, investigating its foundations and nature. Based on this, the article examines relevant jurisprudence in the European Union regarding the right against self-incrimination, identifies key perspectives and divergences in its application to legal entities, ultimately providing considerations on the scope of this right in this context.
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